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FDA APPROVAL OF DRUGS AND 
DEVICES: PREEMPTION OF 
STATE LAWS FOR “PARALLEL” 




I.     INTRODUCTION 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s important ruling in Mutual Pharmaceutical 
Co., Inc. v. Bartlett1 concerns whether the Food and Drug Administration’s 
(“FDA”) approval of a generic drug insulates the drug manufacturer from 
liability under state tort laws from claims of injury due to an alleged 
“design defect.”2 The Court previously ruled that FDA approval does not 
preempt state law claims based upon failure-to-warn, at least with respect to 
brand name products.3  In contrast, the Court previously ruled that the 
federal regulatory process leading to FDA approval of generic equivalents 
of brand drugs—and designation of the drug label—does preempt state law 
as to claims that challenge the warnings that accompany generic drugs.4 
Thus, generic manufacturers are held immune from liability under state law 
for product liability, at least as to alleged failure-to-warn of adverse 
effects.5 This is primarily because generic drug manufacturers have no 
control over the drug label, which the FDA established in consultation with 
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 1. 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).  
 2. See id. at 2470 (holding that federal law preempts state design regarding generic drug 
adequacy of a warning in design-defect liability). 
 3.  See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009) (concluding that the plaintiff’s state law 
failure-to-warn claim was not preempted by defendant’s federal-law obligations and that 
Congress’ purpose was not obstructed). 
 4. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2572 (2011) (holding that the federal drug 
regulations for generic drug manufacturers preempt the state-law claims that conflict with those 
regulations).   
 5. See id. (holding that where federal drug regulations directly conflict with a duty to warn 
imposed by state law, the state law will be preempted).  
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the brand manufacturer.6 In Bartlett, however, the issue was not failure-to-
warn, but rather the design of the generic counterpart.7  Although the active 
ingredients are chemically equivalent, a generic is not an identical drug.8 
The plaintiff in Bartlett alleged that the generic equivalent, also approved 
by the FDA, was flawed by a design-defect that made it unsafe for sale 
under state law.9  
In each of these cases, the underlying issue has been whether the 
federal regulatory process leading to FDA approval of drugs and medical 
devices “preempt” state laws as to the safety issues addressed through the 
approval process. Thus, to summarize the applicable law prior to Bartlett, 
the Court had upheld failure-to-warn10 claims against the brand 
(preemption denied) but denied failure-to-warn11 claims against the generic 
(preemption upheld); the Court has also denied device manufacturers’ 
liability for most product liability-related claims12 (preemption upheld) 
pursuant to a specific statutory provision.13 By a vote of 5-4, Bartlett has 
now denied liability of generic manufacturers on the basis of design-
defect.14  Following the Supreme Court opinion, however, the FDA set 
forth its agenda, which includes proposing a rule that would allow generic 
drug makers to revise their drug labels.15  If created and adopted, this rule 
 
 6. See id. at 2574–75 (stating that the FDA regulates warning labels). 
 7. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470 (explaining the design-defect cause of action against the 
generic manufacturer, and the inherent problems with such a cause of action).  
 8. See Facts About Generic Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/Understan
dingGenericDrugs/ucm167991.htm (last updated Sept. 19, 2012) (noting the differences between 
generic and brand name drugs, which include variations in inactive chemical ingredients and rate 
of absorption).  
 9. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471–72 (referencing the plaintiff’s design-defect claim); see 
also PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2572 (framing the question as whether or not the federal drug 
regulations preempt state law claims). 
 10. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009) (allowing the state failure-to-warn claim 
as supported by the history of co-existence between state and federal law and the FDA’s 
recognition of state law remedies).   
 11. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2571 (holding that the federal regulations applicable to generic 
drug manufacturers preempt state law claims). 
 12. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008) (finding that manufacturer 
liability for state product liability claims are preempted to the extent that the state law 
requirements are different from, or in addition to the federal requirements).  
 13. See 21 U.S.C. § 360(k)(a)(1) (2012) (prohibiting the imposition of state law requirements 
different from, or in addition to federal law requirements); see also Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330 (noting 
that state law requirements are preempted to the extent that they are different from, or in addition 
to federal requirements).  
 14. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2469, 2470 (holding that state law design-defect claims based 
on the adequacy of the warning label are preempted). 
 15. See Alexander Gaffney, FDA Proposes Groundbreaking Overhaul of Generic Drug 
Labeling Regulation, REG. AFF. PROF. SOC’Y (Nov. 11, 2013), 
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could again alter the landscape of liability for generic manufacturers.16  
Further, the related issue (which is still unresolved by the high court and is 
the subject of a split among the circuit courts)17 is whether FDA approval 
of medical devices preempts all state law actions, thus insulating device 
manufacturers from product liability claims under all circumstances.18  This 
Article will address each of these issues, as well as the related issue of 
whether off-label use of FDA-approved medical devices give rise to 
liability.19 
 
II.     BACKGROUND 
 
The FDA, pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act20 
(“FDCA”), is charged with the oversight of pharmaceutical and medical 
device production, sales, labeling, and marketing.21  Pursuant to the FDCA 
mandate, the FDA follows a rigorous approval process for new drugs and 
devices that requires each product to be tested for safety and, in the case of 
drugs, efficacy of each intended use.22  A New Drug Application (“NDA”) 
requires the manufacturer to submit reports of its clinical investigations,23 
non-clinical investigations to the extent relevant, and “any other data or 
information relevant to an evaluation of the safety and effectiveness of the 
 
http://www.raps.org/regulatoryDetail.aspx?id=9625# (describing the agenda following the Bartlett 
decision as including a proposed rule for generic manufacturers to apply for a labeling change).  
 16. See Justin Hakes, U.S. Chamber Decries FDA’s Proposed Rule on Generic Prescription 
Drug Labeling, BUS. WIRE (Nov. 8, 2013), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20131108005889/en/U.S.-Chamber-Decries-
FDA%E2%80%99s-Proposed-Rule-Generic#.VBDl8PldWWY (citing concerns that the proposed 
rule would allow a flood of litigation against generic drug manufacturers).  
 17. Cf. Messner v. Medtronic, Inc., 975 N.Y.S.2d 367 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (unpublished 
opinion) (explaining that the Supreme Court did not delineate what state parallel claims would 
survive preemption, and that the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and possibly Eighth Circuits, have allowed 
parallel state law causes of action for certain violations).  
 18. See Alton v. Medtronic. Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1084 (D. Or. 2013) (discussing the 
issue of whether or not all parallel state law claims are preempted by FDA approval of medical 
devices).  
 19. See infra Parts IV, V.    
 20. See 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).  
 21. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 393(a)–(b) (2012) (establishing the FDA’s mission as including 
the oversight of regulated products, including drugs and devices); see, e.g., id. § 355(b)(1)(B)–(F) 
(outlining the FDA’s oversight of new drug production, sales, and marketing); see also, e.g., id. § 
360e(c)(1) (outlining the FDA’s oversight of new devices, including production, sales, and 
marketing).  
 22. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (detailing the application process for new drugs); see also Valley 
Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing the inclusion of 
efficacy studies in new drug applications).  
 23. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A). 
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drug product . . . from any source.”24  The FDA employs a standard stating 
that the drugs’ “probable therapeutic benefits must outweigh its risk of 
harm.”25  
The approval process for generic drugs follow a different path.26 In 
order to expedite the approval of generic drugs, Congress enacted the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly 
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act (“Hatch-Waxman”).27  Hatch-Waxman 
encourages competition among generic manufacturers by allowing generic 
competitors to “piggyback” on FDA-approved drugs by means of an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application.28 A generic competitor must 
demonstrate that its product is the chemical equivalent to the brand drug.29  
With respect to pharmaceuticals, once a product is deemed safe and 
effective for one or more uses, the manufacturer creates a drug label.30 
The function of the drug label is to inform prescribers and consumers 
through the publication of the established name of the drug, its ingredients, 
indications, directions for use, and summary of its adverse effects, 
contraindications, and effectiveness.31 If the manufacturer fails to provide a 
complete and accurate drug label, or if the manufacturer otherwise suggests 
that the drug may be prescribed or recommended for other uses not 
approved by the FDA, it is considered “misbranding,” and may subject the 
manufacturer to civil and criminal penalties.32  It is important to note that 
manufacturers of generic drugs are prohibited from altering the drug 
label.33 Indeed, approval of the generic drug can be withdrawn if the label 
is changed, resulting in a “misbranding” of the drug.34 
 
 24. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(iv) (2013). 
 25. See Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 140 
(2000) (describing the FDA’s cost benefit analysis involved in approving new drugs).  
 26. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2471 (2013) (describing the approval 
process for generic drugs, generally).  
 27. See id. (recounting the adoption of the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
 28. See Joel Graham, Note, The Legality of Hatch-Waxman Pharmaceutical Settlements: Is 
the Terazosin Test the Proper Prescription? 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 429, 434 (2006) (describing 
how Hatch-Waxman encourages “piggybacking”). 
 29. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471 (describing the aspects of chemical equivalency mandated 
by Hatch-Waxman). 
 30. See 21 C.F.R § 314.50 (2013) (describing the approval of a new drug based on the FDA’s 
safety determination, which also allows the manufacturer to finalize the proposed label).  
 31. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a), (e), (n) (2012) (prescribing the factors that the drug label must 
meet in order to avoid being deemed misbranded).  
 32. See id. § 355(d) (outlining the classification of misbranding by the FDA). 
 33. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471 (noting that generic manufacturers are barred from 
changing the drug label).   
 34. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10) (2014) (explaining that approval can be withdrawn if the 
labeling for the drug product is “no longer consistent” with the listed drug that the abbreviated 
NDA refers to). 
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The FDA’s authority, which does not cover the practice of medicine, 
does not, however, prevent physicians from prescribing approved drugs “off 
label”35 (which means treating conditions not specifically approved by the 
FDA36).  Off-label use is common and, indeed, it is frequently even the 
standard of care.37  As a result, the American Medical Association 
(“AMA”) has consistently taken the position that “a physician may lawfully 
use an FDA-approved drug product or medical device for an unlabeled 
indication . . . .”38  
FDA approval of medical devices follows yet a different process.  The 
FDCA, and specifically its Medical Device Amendments, classifies medical 
devices as Class I, Class II, or Class III, depending upon the potential risk 
or anticipated misuse or injury that may result from use of the drugs.39  
Class III devices are those marketed as life-supporting devices or any other 
device that may cause an unreasonable risk of illness or injury, and 
therefore require the greatest scrutiny.40  While most Class I and II medical 
devices do not require FDA approval prior to marketing, Class III devices 
require substantial oversight and are subjected to a rigorous pre-marketing 
approval process conducted by the FDA before they may be sold.41   
Despite the rigor of the FDA process, approved drugs and devices 
nevertheless sometimes cause injury.  It is estimated that 10.2% of drugs 
approved by the FDA between 1975 and 1999 have either been assigned a 
 
 35. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. Thus, while the FDA prohibits a manufacturer 
from promoting a drug for an unapproved indication, once a drug is FDA-approved for at least one 
indication and is placed into interstate commerce, medical providers are free to prescribe it for any 
purpose, regardless of its labeling, subject only to professional standards. See United States v. 
Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152–53, (2nd Cir. 2012). When a drug is used for a condition or in a 
manner that deviates from that described in the FDA-approved drug label, the use is considered 
"off-label." This includes use of the drug to treat a different medical condition or disease, as well 
as use in a dosage or route that deviates from that described in the approved label. See infra note 
37 and accompanying text. 
 36. See Michael D. Green & William B. Schultz, Tort Law Deference to FDA Regulation of 
Medical Devices, 88 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2133 (2000) (noting that physicians are permitted to 
prescribe drugs for off-label uses); see also Christopher M. Wittich et al., Ten Common Questions 
(and Their Answers) About Off-label Drug Use, 87 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 982, 983 (2006) 
(explaining that physicians frequently prescribe off-label drugs).  
 37. See Wittich et al., supra note 36 (explaining that physicians frequently prescribe off-label 
drugs). 
 38. Statement, Am. Soc’y of Hosp. Pharm., ASHP Statement on the Use of Medications for 
Unlabeled Uses (1992) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.ashp.org/DocLibrary/BestPractices/FormStUnlabeled.aspx.  
 39. See 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(1)–(2) (2014) (defining what makes devices Class I, II, or III, 
differentiated by level of risk). 
 40. See § 860.3(c)(3) (defining Class III devices as those where the device is life-supporting 
or life-sustaining, or for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of 
human health, or if the device presents a potential reasonable risk of illness or injury).  
 41. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 316–17 (2008) (explaining the different 
classes of devices); see also 21 U.S.C. § 860(a)(1)(A) (2012).  
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black box warning (denoting a severe safety risk), or have been withdrawn 
from the market entirely. 42  In some cases, it was determined that the FDA 
was provided with inaccurate or incomplete data from the drug trials.43  In 
other cases, either unanticipated side effects occurred, or known side effects 
occurred to an unanticipated number of patients.44 In still other cases, the 
efficacy was less than expected or unacceptable in light of the risks.45  
Similar safety issues plague FDA-approved drugs that remain on the 
market, as more than 100,000 consumers are killed every year as a 
consequence of medical devices and pharmaceutical use.46 
The question has long been debated as to whether the federal 
regulatory process leading to FDA approval of drugs and devices 
“preempts” state law, thus foreclosing product liability actions that 
challenge drug safety and/or the reasonableness of their warnings.47  While 
the FDA can withdraw approval of a dangerous drug or device—or issue 
other mandates—the law does not provide a private right of action to a 
consumer injured by an approved product.48 The arguments in favor of 
FDA preemption are not without some appeal: the role of the FDA is to 
impose uniform standards for drug and medical device safety; without 
preemption, court decisions by individual states could undermine the 
FDA’s regulatory framework by potentially creating conflicting standards 
 
 42. See Daniel Kazhdan, Other Developments in Intellectual Property: Wyeth and PLIVA: 
The Law of Inadequate Drug Labeling, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 893, 904 (2012) (citing a 2002 
study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association describing the statistics of 
serious warnings and market removals).   
 43. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 343 (2001) 
(explaining that the plaintiffs contend that the petitioner made fraudulent representations to the 
FDA in order to obtain approval). 
 44. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 592 A.2d. 1176, 1179 (N.J.1991) (stating that the 
package contained no warning of the potential side effects of tooth discoloration). 
 45. See Cooper Labs., Inc. v. Comm’r, Fed. Food & Drug Admin., 501 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974) (holding that the FDA’s rejection of a new drug was proper because evidence 
supporting the drug’s efficacy did not meet statutory standards).   
 46. See Jason Lazarou et al., Incidence of Adverse Drug Reactions in Hospitalized Patients, 
279 JAMA 1200, 1202 (1998), available at 
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=187436  
(estimating that in 1994, approximately 106,000 deaths in the United States were due to an 
adverse drug reaction).   
 47. See Bryan G. Scott & Elizabeth K. Strickland, Recent Developments in Federal 
Preemption of Pharmaceutical Drug and Medical Device Product Liability Claims, THE 
DEFENDER, Fall 2009, at 22, available at http://www.spilmanlaw.com/media%20content/media-
content/documents/preemption-developments.pdf (noting the debate over the past few years over 
the interplay between state tort laws, and federal regulation of pharmaceutical drugs and medical 
devices).  
 48. See Bailey v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that Congress did not 
intend, either expressly or by implication, to create a private cause of action under the FDCA). 
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that intrude on the FDA’s authority.49 Fifty different state courts could 
establish conflicting standards to determine whether drugs approved by the 
FDA were safe and effective.50 By vesting the FDA with exclusive 
enforcement authority, federal law would impose uniform standards to 
regulate the safety and efficacy of products, despite local rules.51 Federal 
law also serves to discourage lay juries from making independent 
determinations about safety.52  Presumably, exclusive FDA jurisdiction 
would also prevent litigants from bringing legal action based on claims that 
a certain product should not have gained FDA approval at all.53   
Of course, opponents of preemption also have a compelling argument: 
the FDCA does not include any private right of action.54  In the absence of 
state tort laws, there would be no redress for plaintiffs who sustain severe 
injuries from unsafe pharmaceutical products.55 In 2009, the U.S. Supreme 
Court, after considerable oral argument and review of the legislative history 
of the FDCA, determined that such a result was unacceptable.56  
Addressing the issue of brand liability, the Court issued a landmark 
opinion in the 2009 matter of Wyeth v. Levine.57 In Levine, a Vermont 
woman brought a personal injury claim in state court after injecting the 
drug Phenergan.58 The drug was manufactured by Wyeth Laboratories and 
is an antihistamine, which prevents against nausea.59  Complications arose 
 
 49. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 612 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[D]rug labeling by 
jury verdict undermines both our broader preemption jurisprudence and the broader workability of 
the federal drug-labeling regime.”). 
 50. Id. at 626 (explaining that without the FDA, consumers could suffer since juries in all 50 
states would be free to contradict the FDA, and that the benefit of the FDA is the conveyance of 
warnings in one voice, rather than in 50 potentially conflicting ones). 
 51. See Jason C. Miller, Note, When and How to Defer to the FDA: Learning from 
Michigan’s Regulatory Compliance Defense, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 565, 566 
(2009) (explaining that federal regulations preempting state tort laws avoid the asymmetry in the 
state tort systems). 
 52. Id. at 574 (explaining that giving FDA exclusive authority creates accountability not 
afforded to juries).  
 53. Id. at 579–80 (explaining that Michigan has excluded the evolving list of drugs as a basis 
for a liability action). 
 54. See PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin, 601 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the 
Supreme Court has interpreted § 337(a) of the FDCA to mean that the federal government, and not 
private litigants, are authorized to file suit for noncompliance with medical provisions). 
 55. See Miller, supra note 51, at 569 (explaining that only private tort litigation can offer a 
remedy in the event that the FDA approves defective drugs).  
 56. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009) (concluding that Congress has repeatedly 
declined to preempt state law, and that the FDA’s recent position that state tort suits interfere with 
the statutory mandate is entitled to no weight).  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 559. 
 59. Id. (noting that Phernergan is Wyeth’s brand name for promethazine hydrochloride, an 
antihistamine used to treat nausea).  
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from the injection, which eventually led to the amputation of Ms. Levine’s 
arm.60  The plaintiff alleged that Wyeth had failed to include in its label a 
description of the potential arterial injuries that could result from a 
negligent injection of the drug.61 Wyeth defended on the basis that its label 
included FDA-required and approved warnings, and that such FDA 
approval preempted state law tort claims for failure-to-warn.62   
The Levine jury awarded damages after finding the label, despite 
approval by the FDA, to be insufficient under local tort law.63 The Supreme 
Court of Vermont affirmed, concluding that FDA requirements “merely 
provide a floor, not a ceiling” for state regulation.64  Thus, states are 
entitled to require more stringent measures for labeling drugs as long as 
they are not inconsistent with the FDA requirements.65 The U.S. Supreme 
Court also affirmed, finding that state-law tort actions for failure-to-warn 
against a manufacturer of a brand drug are not preempted by the FDA 
approval process.66 
Wyeth v. Levine stands in sharp contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
2011 decision in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing (“PLIVA”).67 There, the Court 
was confronted with an alleged “failure to warn” claim where the plaintiff 
sued a generic drug manufacturer under state law for inadequately labeling 
its generic product.68 The plaintiff in PLIVA alleged that she developed the 
(often irreversible) movement disorder, known as tardive dyskinesia,69 as a 
result of taking PLIVA’s metoclopramide (the generic form of Reglan)—a 
drug used to treat a digestive tract problem.70 The plaintiff brought a state 
 
 60. Id. (explaining that the plaintiff, Levine, developed gangrene, and doctors amputated her 
right hand, and eventually her entire arm). 
 61. See id. at 559–60 (arguing that although a gangrene warning was included on Phenergan’s 
label, the label should have included a warning against administering the drug via the higher-risk 
intravenous IV-push method, instead advising clinicians to use the safer IV-drip method of 
injection). 
 62. Id. at 560 (explaining that Wyeth argued that Levine’s failure-to-warn claims were 
preempted by federal law).  
 63. Id. at 562. 
 64. Id. at 563. 
 65. Id. (concluding that as long as federal law and state law are not in conflict, then state law 
judgment is not preempted). 
 66. Id. at 581 (finding that state failure-to-warn cases do not obstruct federal regulation). 
 67. Compare PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577–78 (2011) (noting that it was 
impossible for manufacturers to comply with both federal and state law, requiring state law to be 
preempted), with Mensing v. Wyeth, 588 F.3d 603, 614 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding Mensing’s claim 
can proceed and federal law requires such cases proceed), and Demahy v. Actavis, 593 F.3d 428, 
449 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that if Congress had intended to prevent state tort law cases, Congress 
would have clearly expressed that intent).   
 68. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2572. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 2572–73. 
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law failure-to-warn claim against the generic manufacturer, alleging that the 
warnings accompanying the drug failed to adequately warn consumers that 
prolonged use of metoclopramide could cause tardive dyskinesia.71 
The case ultimately reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which denied the 
plaintiff’s claim in a 5-4 ruling.72 The Court held that the FDA requirement 
that generic drugs be chemically equivalent to the brand product also 
prevents generic manufacturers from altering the FDA-approved label.73 
Thus, the PLIVA Court found that with respect to generic drugs, FDA 
regulations preempt state law and preclude failure-to-warn claims.74  To 
hold otherwise would require generic manufacturers to do the impossible: 
comply with FDA labeling requirements, while also complying with 
various state laws by altering the label to impose stricter warnings in order 
to avoid allegations of failure-to-warn.75 
Levine also stands in contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2008 
opinion in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,76 a case that concerns whether FDA 
approval of medical devices insulates the manufacturer from state law 
product liability.77 In Riegel, the plaintiffs represented a class in an action 
against the manufacturer of a balloon catheter, which allegedly ruptured 
while in the lead plaintiff’s artery during the course of an angioplasty 
procedure.78 The manufacturer of the balloon catheter had sought pre-
marketing approval of the device by the FDA.79  The FDA’s protocol for 
approval of medical devices requires increasing scrutiny, depending upon 
the classification of the device.80 The catheter at issue was a Class III 
medical device that required the highest level of FDA participation: pre-
 
 71. Id. at 2570 (noting that the Plaintiffs argued that the manufacturers inadequately labeled 
the metoclopramide by failing to warn of the risks of long term use).  
 72. Id. at 2571, 2582. 
 73. See id. at 2580–81 (noting that any change to the drug would require the manufacturer to 
seek FDA approval).  
 74. See id. at 2581 (noting that because the pharmacist filled the prescription with the generic 
medication and not the brand-name, the state-tort claim was preempted). 
 75. See Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 37 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 
694 (2012), and rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (citing PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2578 (2011) (“Generic 
drug manufacturers, unlike brand-name manufacturers, cannot unilaterally change their labels . . . 
.”).  
 76. See 552 U.S. 312, 322 (2008) (noting that the Court has consistently held that FDA 
approval does not preempt state tort suits).  
 77. Compare Riegel, 552 U.S. at 345 (holding that 21 U.S.C. § 360(k)(a) does not preempt 
Riegel’s suit), with Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 628 (holding that state law is preempted). 
 78. See Riegel, 522 U.S. at 320 (noting that Riegel alleged that the catheter’s design, label, 
and manufacturing violated New York common law). 
 79. Id. (noting the Evergreen Balloon Catheter had received pre-marketing approval from the 
FDA).   
 80. See id. at 316–17 (noting that there are three classes, with Class III receiving the highest 
level of scrutiny). 
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marketing approval.81 The federal district court granted summary judgment 
to the defendant on the basis that pre-marketing approval had been 
granted,82 and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals thereafter affirmed.83 
After granting certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court found that, with 
respect to devices, the FDCA—specifically including its Medical Device 
Amendments (“MDA”)84—operates as the exclusive enforcement 
mechanism to establish the safety of medical devices approved, pursuant to 
the FDA’s rigorous regulations guiding Class III devices.85 The MDA’s 
exclusivity provision that is applicable to medical devices (but not drugs) 
expressly “preempts” state laws, and a plaintiff injured by a medical device 
cannot look to state courts for compensation that would otherwise be 
available under tort theories such as negligence, failure-to-warn, or breach 
of warranty.86  
Although it might appear that the issue in the 2013 Mutual 
Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Bartlett87 case concerning the tort liability of a 
generic manufacturer would have been resolved by PLIVA, Bartlett 
presented the Court with an alternative theory of product liability.88  The 
plaintiff in Bartlett alleged that the drug should not have been marketed, 
despite FDA approval.89 The plaintiff’s arguments rested not on the basis of 
failure-to-warn, but on marketing a drug that the plaintiff claimed was 
unreasonably dangerous due to an alleged design-defect.90  Neither PLIVA 
nor Levine had previously considered the state law tort liability of a generic 
manufacturer on the basis of design-defect.91  
Before reviewing the Bartlett decision, as well as the pending cases on 
the related issue of medical device liability, it is important to define two 
forms of preemption that the courts distinguish: express preemption, and 
 
 81. See id. at 317–20 (noting that the catheter is a Class III device, which is the highest level 
of classification). 
 82. See id. at 320 (noting that the Evergreen Balloon Catheter received pre-marketing 
approval by the FDA).  
 83. Id. at 321 n.2 (noting that the Second Circuit Court affirmed the district court’s decision 
granting summary judgment).  
 84. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 360 (2012). 
 85. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316 (stating that Congress passed the MDA, and included an 
express preemption provision).  
 86. See id. at 322–23 (noting that unlike general labeling duties, pre-marketing approval is 
specific to individual devices  and is not an exemption from federal safety review); see id. at 324–
25 (stating that the Court has consistently found federal statutes to preempt state tort claims). 
 87. 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). 
 88. See id. at 2478 (observing that the plaintiff advanced the stop-selling rationale). 
 89.  See id. (noting that Bartlett argued the stop-selling rationale). 
 90. See id. at 2488 (observing that the design-defect claim is for an “unreasonably dangerous” 
product). 
 91. See id. at 2472, 2480 (noting that neither Mensing nor Levine had addressed this issue). 
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implied preemption. Express preemption occurs when a statute or case law 
explicitly provides for it.92 The MDA, for example, contains a specific 
(statutory) provision concerning the exclusivity of the MDA and Congress’s 
(arguably) stated intent that they occupy the field to the exclusion of 
conflicting state laws.93  So-called “implied preemption” occurs not from 
an explicit statutory pronouncement, but by implication when another 
federal statute or regulation occupies the field in such a way that its 
intended effect cannot be carried out if a conflicting state law is enforced.94  
In this context, it is alleged that the process for FDA approval of drugs 
implicitly preempts certain kinds of claims that give rise to state tort 
actions.95  Specifically, those cases where a plaintiff alleges that a 
manufacturer made an incomplete or fraudulent representation to the FDA 
that led to its product’s approval, and the product thereafter resulted in harm 
to the plaintiff (which constitutes a so-called “fraud on the FDA” claim).96 
The rationale is that the FDA regulatory process “occupies the field” on this 
issue, and that such claims should remain within the exclusive enforcement 
authority of the FDA:97  
 
the relationship between a federal agency and the entity it 
regulates is inherently federal in character because the 
relationship originates from, is governed by, and terminates 
according to federal law.98 
 
The concept of “implied preemption” thus addresses the concern that 
the FDA might determine that certain mandated disclosures were complete 
or adequate, only to have lay juries in state courts second-guess such 
 
 92. See Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of a State Law 
Products Liability Claim, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 440 (2009) (defining express preemption as a 
statutory text that prohibits state-tort law claims). 
 93. See id. (noting that the intent of the MDA was to preempt state tort cases that prevent 
production of devices that could help those in need). 
 94. See Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug Cases, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 463, 464 (2009) (defining implied preemption as a conflict between federal and 
state statutes, where the intended effect of the federal statute cannot be carried out). 
 95. See id. at 470 (noting that the process of FDA approval still requires costly input for 
litigation). 
 96. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001); see, e.g., 
Michael P. Moreland, Tort Reform by Regulation: FDA Prescription Drug Labeling Rules and 
Preemption of State Tort Claims, 1 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 39, 57 (2007) (noting that the suit 
claimed that the manufacturer lied to the FDA, and therefore was improperly given market 
clearance).  
 97. See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 352 (noting that there is clear evidence that Congress meant 
that the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 be enforced exclusively by the Federal 
Government). 
 98. Id. at 347. 
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disclosures and find them insufficient under local law.99  In an undertaking 
where FDA approval is the gold standard, the argument is that 
manufacturers should not be held to satisfy the standards of the FDA’s 
regulatory regime while also complying with every state’s individual tort 
laws;100 if manufacturers are brought to state court, then manufacturers 
would be subject to the unpredictability of countless jury verdicts rendered 
under a spectrum of different standards.101 This argument has largely been 
successful with respect to medical devices governed by the MDA, while it 
has largely been unsuccessful with respect to state law negligence and 
failure-to-warn claims as to FDA-approved brand drugs where there is no 





III.     MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL CO., INC. V. BARTLETT 
 
A.     First Circuit Opinion 
 
In Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Bartlett,103 the plaintiff suffered 
pain in her shoulder, and to treat this pain, she was prescribed a generic 
form of the non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug (“NSAID”) known as 
Sulindac.104 NSAIDs are known to cause two rare but serious 
hypersensitivity skin reactions that include necrosis of the skin and mucous 
membranes (toxic epidermal necrolysis),105 and a somewhat less severe 
 
 99. Id. at 351 (holding that disclosures to the FDA may be deemed appropriate by the 
administration, but may be judged insufficient in a state court). 
 100. Id. at 350 (explaining that it will be impractical for manufacturers, and will increase the 
burden of manufacturers to comply with FDA’s detailed regulatory regime and the 50 state tort 
regimes). 
 101. See id. (noting that manufacturers might be exposed to unpredictable civil liability, and 
may be discouraged from seeking FDA approval for their devices). 
 102. Compare Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (explaining that for drug products, 
Congress intended state rights of action to provide appropriate relief for injured consumers), with 
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2580, 2581 (2011) (holding that a manufacturer cannot 
independently satisfy state duties for preemption purposes without the FDA’s permission), and 
Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578, 584 (2013) (concluding that compliance with federal and 
state duties was not possible, and impossibility preemption is inappropriate).   
 103. 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). 
 104. Id. at 2471. The FDA approved generic "sulindac" in 1978 under the brand name Clinoril, 
followed by several generic versions after patent expiration, including one that Mutual 
Pharmaceutical Co. would manufacture. Id. at 2471. 
 105.  Toxic epidermal necrolysis is a rare but severe condition where the epidermis (upper 
layer of the skin) can separate from the skin. Thomas Harr & Lars E. French, Toxic Epidermal 
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related condition, Stevens-Johnson Syndrome.106  When the Sulindac was 
prescribed to Ms. Bartlett in 2004, the label did warn of “severe skin 
reactions,” but did not specifically identify either toxic epidermal necrolysis 
or Stevens-Johnson Syndrome as a potential risk.107 Both conditions, 
however, were listed on the package insert as potential adverse reactions, as 
was the possibility of death.108 
The First Circuit noted that the trial court found “overwhelming 
evidence” that Sulindac caused Ms. Bartlett to suffer Stevens-Johnson 
Syndrome/toxic epidermal necrosis (“SJS/TEN”), and that as a result, she 
was left permanently injured and horribly disfigured.109  Bartlett’s lawsuit 
alleged that Sulindac had a defective design, and urged the court to find that 
Sulindac was unreasonably dangerous under the product liability standards 
that were in effect in Bartlett’s home state of New Hampshire.110  Mutual 
defended on the basis that claims of design-defect are preempted under 
federal law since the FDA requires the active ingredients in generic drugs to 
be chemically equivalent to those in the brand.111  A jury found in favor of 
 
Necrolysis and Stevens-Johnson Syndrome, ORPHANET J. RARE DISEASES (Dec. 16, 2010), 
available at http://www.ojrd.com/content/5/1/39.  
 106. Id. at 2471–72. 
 107. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 731 F. Supp. 2d 135, 142 (D.N.H. 2010) (explaining that 
Sulindac’s label listed “severe skin reactions” under its “Warnings” section, and Stevens-Johnson 
Syndrome and toxic epidermal necrolysis under its “Adverse Reactions” section), aff’d, 678 F.3d 
30, 37 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012), and rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). 
 108. Id. (noting that the label listed Stevens-Johnson Syndrome and Toxic Epidermal 
Necrolysis as potential adverse reactions in its “Adverse Reactions” section). Subsequent to the 
plaintiff's injury in 2005, the FDA completed a comprehensive review of NSAIDs and 
recommended that the label of all brand and generic forms be amended to specifically warn of 
toxic epidermal necrolysis. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2472. 
 109. See Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2012) (describing that Bartlett’s 
skin lesions involved 60–65% of her body), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012), and rev'd, 133 S. 
Ct. 2466 (2013); see also Bartlett, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 142 (noting that Bartlett was in the hospital 
for three months, spending two months in a medically induced coma, and suffered permanent 
injuries, including blindness). 
 110. See Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 34 (stating that Bartlett brought claims for breach of warranty, 
fraud, negligence, design-defect, failure-to-warn, and manufacturing defect); see also Bartlett, 133 
S. Ct. at 2471–72 (stating that NSAIDs, including Sulindac, were known in 2004 to potentially 
cause toxic epidermal necrolysis).  
 111. Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 37. Bartlett stands in contrast to prior lower court opinions that 
uniformly rejected the concept that the generic drug should not have been marketed at all. See, 
e.g., Moore v. Mylan, Inc. 840 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1352 n. 14 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (noting that any 
negligence claim is preempted because the plaintiff has not shown that there is a state law that 
asks the manufacturer to stop producing the drug when the FDA has granted authority to do so); 
Coney v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., No. 6:11-cv-35, 2012 WL 170143, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 19, 2012) 
(explaining that if a state law prohibits a manufacturer from doing what federal law explicitly 
requires the manufacturer to do, it confers supremacy upon the state law); In re Fosamax 
(Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. 11), No. 08-008 (GEB-LHG), 2011 WL 5903623, 
at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2011) (holding that FDA statutory requirements preempts any conflicting 
tort duty arising under state law); Lance v. Wyeth, 4 A.3d 160 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (declining to 
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the plaintiff and awarded her $21.06 million dollars in compensatory 
damages.112  The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the jury verdict, 
and Mutual appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.113 
In pursuing her theory of a state-law design-defect on appeal to the 
First Circuit, Bartlett alleged that Sulindac’s “risks outweighed its 
benefits[,] making it unreasonably dangerous to consumers, despite the 
[FDA] having never withdrawn its statutory ‘safe and effective’ designation 
that the original manufacturer had secured[,] and on which Mutual was 
entitled to piggyback.”114 Mutual’s appeal alleged that federal law forbids 
the generic drug from altering the label.115 The First Circuit acknowledged 
this basic PLIVA principle, but distinguished its finding on the basis that 
Bartlett purported that the drug had a design-defect that made it 
“unreasonably dangerous” under New Hampshire law.116 Thus, the First 
Circuit was not critical of the fact that the label did not warn the plaintiff of 
her injury; rather, the First Circuit concluded that the generic manufacturer 
had not foreseen the inherent danger of such injuries and opted not to 
market the product at all.117  
The First Circuit’s opinion in Bartlett represented a departure from a 
binding line of cases to the contrary, and Bartlett’s holding would require 
that generic manufacturers be liable for injuries caused by a product that the 
FDA did not deem to be unreasonably dangerous.118 The Solicitor General 
argued in his amicus curiae brief that the obligation to determine the risk, 
 
impose on manufacturers a common law duty to recall a drug in the absence of a state statute or 
administrative mandate to recall a drug). 
 112. Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 43. 
 113. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).  
 114. Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 34–35 (citations omitted).  
 115. Id. at 41. 
 116. Id. at 34–36 (noting that by trial date, Bartlett’s remaining theory of design-defect was 
that Sulindac’s risks outweighed its benefits).  
 117. Id. at 41 (stating that under the current law, the original manufacturer and not the generic 
manufacturer can alter the label); see also Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2472 (explaining that in 2005, 
after Ms. Bartlett's injury, the FDA recommended changes to the warnings of all NSAIDs, 
including Sulindac, to specifically identify toxic epidermal necrolysis as an adverse side effect). 
 118. Compare Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 37 (explaining that the statute contains no general 
preemption provision, and that state law serves as a “complementary form of drug regulation”), 
with Moore v. Mylan, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (concluding that because the 
manufacturer was prevented by federal law from changing labels to conform with a state law, the 
failure-to-warn claim is preempted), and Coney v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., No. 6:11-cv-35, 2012 WL 
170143 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 19, 2012) (holding that it would confer supremacy to state law if the 
manufacturer is prohibited by state law from doing what federal law requires it to do), and In re 
Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. 11), No. 08-008 (GEB-LHG), 2011 WL 
5903623 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2011) (stating that federal duty preempts plaintiff’s claims), and Lance 
v. Wyeth, 4 A.3d 160 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (declining to impose upon a drug manufacturer a 
common law duty to recall a drug, and stating that the FDA has the power to withdraw approval of 
prescription drugs). 
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benefit, and overall safety of drugs was within the exclusive purview of the 
FDA, and that neither generic nor brand manufacturers should make 
decisions about whether drugs were too risky for marketing.119 The 
Solicitor General urged the Court not to impose a duty on a manufacturer to 
recall a drug, either brand or generic, when it is deemed to have a design-
defect.120 To do so otherwise, he argued, would interfere directly with the 
authority of the FDA as final arbiter of the safety and effectiveness of 
approved drugs.121 
The First Circuit also reviewed Wyeth v. Levine,122 where the U.S. 
Supreme Court found that state-law tort actions for failure-to-warn against a 
manufacturer of a brand drug are not preempted by the FDA approval 
process.123 Of course, neither Wyeth nor PLIVA addressed the issue of 
whether consumers can bring claims alleging design-defect against drug 
manufacturers.124 These cases are significant, however, in that the Supreme 
Court clearly treated brand and generic drugs differently with respect to 
product-liability claims based upon failure-to-warn.125  In its 5-4 holding, 
the PLIVA Court concluded that generic drug manufacturers would be 
shielded from liability on the basis that they cannot alter the drug label.126  
It is notable that the First Circuit in Bartlett relied primarily on the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Wyeth, while the First Circuit largely 
sidestepped the decision in PLIVA.127 Bartlett noted that although Wyeth is 
“technically limited to failure-to-warn claims, its logic applies to design 
defect claims as well.”128  Indeed, it opined that PLIVA “carved out an 
 
 119. Brief for Petitioner at 24, Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (No. 12-
142) (stating that Congress has vested the FDA with the responsibility to determine if a product is 
safe and effective prior to entering the interstate market). 
 120. Id. at 28 (arguing that it would be inconsistent with the FDCA to require a manufacturer 
to recall a product approved by the FDA if a jury under state tort law finds the product unsafe). 
 121. Id. (describing that such state-by-state considerations would undermine the FDA’s drug-
safety determinations).  
 122. 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
 123. Id. at 581 (holding that the FDA’s position that state tort suits interfere with its statutory 
mandate has no weight). 
 124. Id. at 558 (stating that the question was whether FDA approval provides a manufacturer 
with a complete defense to a state tort action); see also PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 
2573 (2011) (explaining that the issue was whether the consumers’ claims for failure to provide 
adequate labels are preempted by federal law). 
 125. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2574 (stating that a brand-name manufacturer is responsible for 
accuracy and adequacy of labels, while a generic manufacturer is responsible for ensuring that its 
warning label is the same as the brand name’s label). 
 126. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 37 (1st Cir. 2012) (explaining that, unlike 
brand-name manufacturers, generic drug manufacturers cannot unilaterally change their labels), 
cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012), and rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). 
 127. Id. at 30 (noting that Wyeth resolved the conflict against general preemption, while the 
Supreme Court has not extended PLIVA's exception to design-defect claims).  
 128. Id. at 37. 
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exception to Wyeth, finding that the FDCA preempts failure-to-warn claims 
against generic drug manufacturers. . . . [because] the generic maker cannot 
alter the labeling . . . .”129 According to the First Circuit, Wyeth established 
“a general no-preemption rule,”130 and that if a generic drug company 
places a drug on the market, it incurs the potential for state law failure-to-
warn and design-defect claims.131 
Bartlett challenges the heart of the preemption issue: PLIVA and 
Wyeth were concerned that 50 different states would impose duties on a 
manufacturer, duties of which would be considered to be in addition to 
those duties imposed by the federal government.132  The appellate court in 
Bartlett specifically commented: “it is up to the Supreme Court to decide 
whether PLIVA’s exception is to be enlarged to include design-defect 
claims. Given the widespread use of generic drugs and the developing split 
in the lower courts, this issue needs a decisive answer from the only court 
that can supply it.”133  Ms. Bartlett’s severe injuries provided a compelling 
example of the damage that can be caused by adverse side effects.134 
 
B.     U.S. Supreme Court Opinion 
 
 1.     The majority opinion 
 
On June 24, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a vote of 5-4, found 
that state-law damage claims against a generic drug company alleging that 
design-defects (which are rooted in the inadequacy of the accompanying 
warnings) are preempted by federal law.135 Noting that New Hampshire’s 
tort law requires drug manufacturers to ensure their drugs are not 
unreasonably unsafe, the Court concluded that drug safety must be 
evaluated on the basis of the chemical formulation and the content of the 
warnings.136 Relying upon its own recent decision in PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Mensing, where the Court found that FDA regulations prohibit a generic 
 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 38.  
 131. See id. at 37 (clarifying that effective warnings and design create safe drugs, and that all 
companies placing a drug on the market should be held to the same standard to ensure drug 
safety).   
 132. Id. (finding that the Wyeth rationale does not apply because generic drug manufacturers 
are legally prohibited from changing the label on drugs).  
 133. Id. at 38 (citations omitted). 
 134. Id. at 34 (noting that between 60–65% of the outer skin layer on Karen Bartlett’s body 
deteriorated, was burned, or became a wound, that she spent more than fifty days in Massachusetts 
General Hospital’s burn unit, and that she suffered from permanent near-blindness). 
 135. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2469–70 (2013). 
 136. Id. at 2470.  
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manufacturer from altering either the drugs’ composition or label, the Court 
here concluded that the Supremacy Clause renders the New Hampshire law 
“without effect,” and is effectively preempted since it would require a party 
to violate federal law.137 
For purposes of analysis, Justice Alito, writing for the majority and 
reversing the decision of the First Circuit, concluded that a solution that 
only gives drug manufacturers the option to remove a product from the 
market or pay for injuries is tantamount to “no solution” at all:138 “under 
the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, any 
state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which 
interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.”139 The majority 
went on to conclude that even if there were no express preemption, New 
Hampshire law would be impliedly preempted because it is “impossible for 
a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.”140 Of 
particular significance is the fact that the Court disavows any obligation to 
inquire into congressional intent as to whether preemption was a desired 
consequence of the regulations.141 Both Justice Breyer and Justice 
Sotomayor, who authored separate dissenting opinions, substantially relied 
upon evidence that the majority’s conclusion was not consistent with FDA 
policy, despite the FDA’s position as articulated in its amicus curiae 
brief.142 
The majority relied heavily on the language of New Hampshire’s tort 
law.143 New Hampshire requires manufacturers to ensure that their products 
are not unreasonably dangerous.144 According to the majority, this can be 
 
 137. Id. at 2466, 2470, 2475–76 (noting that the generic drug would be a different drug if it 
were chemically changed, and that it would need its own NDA to be marketed across state lines); 
cf. Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578, 584 (6th Cir. 2013) (denying impossibility preemption, 
as the defendant generic manufacturer could have updated its warning to match the updated 
warning of the brand).  
 138. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470. 
 139. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 140. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2473 (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)). 
 141. Id. at 2480 (rationalizing that Congress's intent can be inferred even without an outright 
expression through outlined statutory duties, and that if federal law will not allow Mutual to act in 
response to the demands of the state, clearly preemption was a desired consequence). 
 142. Id. at 2481–82 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that weight should not be given to the 
FDA’s views on preemption because it did not hold hearings, solicit the views of the public, failed 
to voice its opinion through regulations, and seems to not be able to make up its mind on the 
issue); id. at 2494 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (rejecting the notion that courts are to heed an 
agency’s conclusion about whether a state law is preempted, especially when its analysis does not 
satisfy the “high threshold” to determine that a state law should be preempted when faced with a 
conflicting federal act). 
 143. Id. at 2473–77, 2479, 2480 (majority opinion). 
 144. New Hampshire law recognizes liability for design-defect when "the design of the product 
created a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user . . . " Vautour v. Body Masters 
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accomplished either by modifying the product design, or by adapting the 
warning label.145 To assess whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, 
New Hampshire imposes a “‘risk-utility approach’ under which ‘a product 
is defective as designed if the magnitude of the danger outweighs the utility 
of the product.’”146 In conducting that balancing test, New Hampshire 
examines three factors: (1) the desirability and usefulness of the product; 
(2) the ability of the manufacturer to reduce the risk without materially 
affecting the desirability and usefulness of the product (including the cost); 
and (3) the strength of the warnings to highlight hidden dangers from uses 
that can be foreseen.147 Since redesign of Sulidnac was not an option in 
Bartlett, the lower court’s inquiry focused on the ineffectiveness of 
warnings as evidence of a design-defect.148   
The trial court in Bartlett had devoted considerable attention to 
Sulindac’s label, even allowing into evidence a Comprehensive Review of 
NSAIDs that was completed by the FDA in 2005 (after the Plaintiff’s 
injury), as well as the FDA’s recommendation for a change of the label.149 
The change specifically included identifying toxic epidermal necrolysis as a 
possible adverse effect of both brand and generic NSAIDs.150 Indeed, a 
specific jury instruction directed deliberations in which the jury would 
evaluate the drug label to assess whether it was unreasonably dangerous.151 
The court pointedly instructed the jury that it “should find ‘a defect in 
design’ only if it found that ‘Sulindac was unreasonably dangerous and that 
a warning was not present and effective to avoid that unreasonable 
danger.’”152 The trial court, finding in favor of the plaintiff, based its ruling 
on the jury’s determination that an inadequate label made the product 
unreasonably dangerous pursuant to New Hampshire law.153  Since it was 
clear to the majority that the jury verdict of “design defect” was directly 
 
Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1181 (N.H. 2001) (citation omitted). The assessment of 
"unreasonably dangerous" utilizes a "risk-utility" approach, wherein "a product is defective as 
designed if the magnitude of the danger outweighs the utility of the product." Id. at 1182 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).  
 145. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474. 
 146. Id. at 2474 (quoting Vautour, 784 A.2d at 1182).  
 147. Id. at 2475. 
 148. Id. at 2475–76 (citing Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F. 3d 30, 41 (1st Cir. (2012)) 
(noting that a product is more dangerous if not paired with an effective warning). 
 149. See id. at 2472 (citing Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 731 F. Supp. 2d 135, 146–47 (D.N.H. 
2010)) (highlighting the importance of changing the label in order to decrease its danger). 
 150. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 731 F. Supp. 2d 135, 146–47 (D.N.H. 2010). 
 151. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2476 (presenting the jury with evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that the drug is unreasonably dangerous). 
 152. Id. (citation omitted). 
 153. Id.; see also Bartlett, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 151, 157 (disregarding the fact that generic 
companies cannot change drug labels pursuant to federal law). 
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premised upon a finding of an inadequate warning, the Court found that the 
case would fall clearly within the PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing doctrine.154  
Summarizing its preemption rationale, the Bartlett majority concluded 
that when, as here, “federal law forbids an action that state law requires, the 
state law is ‘without effect.’”155 This is what the majority identified as 
“impossibility pre-emption.”156  With respect to Bartlett’s contention that 
Mutual could decline to market Sulindac or pay damages, the majority was 
unreceptive, rejecting out of hand what it called the “stop-selling rationale” 
as incompatible with principles of preemption.157  The majority refused to 
construe the law as to hold that a party had a viable option to either cease its 
operation or accept liability: “Indeed, if the option of ceasing to act defeated 
a claim of impossibility, impossibility pre-emption would be ‘all but 
meaningless.’”158 Presumably, the Court rejected the solution suggested in 
the dissenting opinions because it would relegate a generic manufacturer to 
the status of a sitting duck, vulnerable to suits from any injured party and 
without recourse or ability to defend itself. 
The majority and the dissenting opinions found agreement on a single 
point that may be significant to the future of preemption jurisprudence: Ms. 
Bartlett’s injuries were tragic and devastating, and all opinions would 
welcome, if not urge, Congress to resolve this preemption issue that has 
“vexed the Court—and produced widely divergent views.”159  Because the 
FDCA “includes neither an express pre-emption clause (as in the vaccine 
context) (citations omitted) nor an express non-pre-emption clause (as in 
the over-the-counter drug context) (citation omitted) . . . [the Court] is left 
to divine Congress’ will . . . ”160 and resort to interpretations of statutory 
and common law, about which there is fundamental disagreement.161   
 
2.     The Breyer dissent 
 
 
 154. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2476, 2478 (deciding that, like PLIVA, it is "impossible" for Mutual 
to satisfy state and federal labeling laws simultaneously when the only remedy is to withdraw 
from the market). 
 155. Id. at 2476–77 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).  
 156. Id. at 2477. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. (quoting PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2579 (2011)). 
 159. Id. at 2480, 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 2496 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 160. Id. at 2480 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 161. See id. at 2479 (majority opinion) (rejecting the dissent's assertion that drug companies 
are not legally obligated to change the Sulindac label or design, and highlighting that in terms of 
common law duty and statutory law, a company can either comply, leave the market, or stay in the 
market and suffer the consequences of non-compliance). 
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Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, issued a brief but compelling 
dissent.  Justice Breyer criticized the majority’s conclusion that it was 
“impossible” to comply with both New Hampshire and federal law, which 
the majority found to be hopelessly in conflict.162  In Justice Breyer’s view, 
Mutual had two options, consistent with state and federal law: (1) it could 
refuse to do business in New Hampshire,163 or (2) it could incur damages 
under New Hampshire law that result from injuries to consumers.164  
Justice Breyer acknowledged that there was a divergence of opinion on 
the preemption issue, but in his view, “[w]here the Statute contains no clear 
pre-emption command, courts may infer that the administrative agency has 
a degree of leeway to determine the extent to which governing statutes, 
rules, [and] regulations . . . have pre-emptive effect.”165  Justice Breyer 
pointed out that although the FDA contributed an amicus curiae brief on the 
case, in developing its position, the FDA neither held hearings nor solicited 
opinions and arguments from the public.166 The FDA also did not issue 
regulations—which it could have done.167 Quoting Bowen v. Georgetown 
Univ. Hospital,168 Justice Breyer commented that an “‘agency litigating 
positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or 
administrative practice’ are entitled to less than ordinary weight.”169 Justice 
Breyer also noted that, unlike Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, where preemption is 
addressed by statute, the FDCA contains no analogous general preemption 
provision with respect to drugs.170 Indeed, Justice Breyer noted that in other 
contexts, the FDA has welcomed state tort law as a kind of “complementary 
form of drug regulation.”171 
 
3.     The Sotomayor dissent 
 
 162. Id. at 2480–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (clarifying that compliance with federal and state 
law is not literally impossible, but that the federal objective may be frustrated if a company can 
only comply by withdrawing from the market or paying a sizable fee). 
 163. Id. at 2481. 
 164. Id. At oral argument, Justice Kagan commented: "the adequacy of the warning is really all 
over this case. There was expert testimony about the adequacy of the warning, there were jury 
instructions about the adequacy of the warning. . . .  which does suggest that this is sort of within 
the four corners of Mensing." Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–31, Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 
(No. 12–142). 
 165. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 166. Id. (noting that the FDA's views were not entitled to deference). 
 167. Id. 
 168. 488 U.S. 204 (1988). 
 169. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Bowen, 488 U.S. at 212–13).  
 170. Id. at 2482; see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).  
 171. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2482 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 
555, 578) (2009)). 
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Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined, issued a 
separate and blistering dissent.172 For purposes of analysis, Justice 
Sotomayor’s dissent divided the operative (preemption) provision into two 
major constituent parts: (a) the intent of Congress on the issue of 
preemption as gleaned from other FDA contexts;173 and (b) the debate over 
the so-called “impossibility” preemption, specifically in contrast to her 
description of “obstacle” preemption.174  
On the issue of congressional intent, Justice Sotomayor initially notes 
the “conspicuous” absence of Wyeth v. Levine175 from the majority opinion, 
even though Levine is clearly distinguishable on the basis of brand vs. 
generic liability.176 Justice Sotomayor also points out that matters of health 
and safety, traditionally subject to a state’s police powers, should not be 
“superseded by a Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose 
of Congress.”177  
According to Justice Sotomayor, Levine supports the principle that 
“federal drug law and state common-law liability have long been 
understood to operate in tandem to promote consumer safety.”178  Levine 
acknowledged that even “as Congress ‘enlarged the FDA powers,’ it also 
‘took care to preserve state law.’”179 More specifically, “Congress adopted 
a saving[s] clause providing that the amendments should not be construed 
to invalidate any provision of State Law absent ‘a direct and positive 
conflict.’”180 Finally, Justice Sotomayor emphasizes that the FDCA does 
not contain any provision that would evince intent to preempt the FDA 
regulations (brand or generic);181 indeed, if the FDA intended preemption, 
it would have said so—just as it did with respect to medical devices.182 
Concluding her opinion with legislative history, Justice Sotomayor offered 
that the absence of a federal damages provision in the FDCA may, in fact, 
 
 172. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. at 2483. 
 174. Id. at 2485. 
 175. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).  
 176. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2483–84 (citing Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 581) (holding that a state 
failure-to-warn claim regarding a brand-name drug did not warrant preemption by federal law, 
whereas Mutual Pharm. Co. focused on allowing generic drug preemption by federal law). 
 177. Id. at 2483 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567.  
 180. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2484 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Drug Amendments of 
1962, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012)).  
 181. Id. at 2491–92 (“[Nothing in] federal law presupposes that drug manufacturers have a 
right to continue to sell a drug free from liability once it has been approved.").  
 182. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k)(2012) (including express 
exemption requirements for medical devices). 
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reflect Congress’s expectation that state tort law would provide for 
monetary compensation to injured plaintiffs.183 
Turning to the issue of preemption on the basis of impossibility, 
Justice Sotomayor would require Mutual to demonstrate an “irreconcilable 
conflict” concerning the state and federal provisions before concluding 
there was a conflict.184 When there is a genuine conflict, according to 
Justice Sotomayor, the inquiry into congressional intent is unnecessary, as 
the language of the statute would make the conclusion of preemption 
“inescapable.”185 Justice Sotomayor thus rejects the majority’s 
“impossibility” argument, suggesting that a clear option in Bartlett was to 
simply compensate the small number of consumers who are injured.186 
Citing, as a starting point, a “presumption against pre-emption,” 
Justice Sotomayor introduces the alternative concept of “obstacle pre-
emption,” which is not explained or defended by the majority.187 As Justice 
Sotomayor describes, obstacle preemption applies when the state law 
“‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal objectives.”188 
Here, the FDA’s policy was to approve Sulindac to be used for its intended 
purpose.189 It was not to prevent consumers injured by the drug from 
receiving fair compensation.190 Pursuant to this obstacle preemption 
rationale, state law would be preempted only if state failure-to-warn or 
design-defect statutes “stands as an obstacle to” making Sulindac available 
for consumer use.191 Justice Sotomayor concludes by acknowledging that 
Mutual’s obstacle preemption defense presents a closer question, but that it 
would also fail, as it conflicts with “the purposes and objectives of the 
FDCA, as supplemented by the Hatch-Waxman Act.”192 
Justice Sotomayor seemed to acknowledge that her position would be 
at least partially at odds with the Court’s 2011 decision in PLIVA, Inc. v. 
 
 183. Bartlett, 555 S. Ct. at 2485 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 184. Id. (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984)). 
 185. Id. (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 
(1963)). 
 186. Id. at 2489 (noting that Mutual could have complied with state requirements while also 
following federal law). 
 187. Id. at 2486, 2491. 
 188. Id. at 2491 (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) 
(citation omitted)). 
 189. See George W. Evans & Arnold I. Friede, The Food and Drug Administration's 
Regulation of Prescription Drug Manufacturer Speech: A First Amendment Analysis, 58 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 365, 388 (2003) (explaining that the main function of the FDA is to ensure that new 
drugs are "safe and effective for their intended uses"). 
 190. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2485 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 
555, 574–75, 574 n.7 (2009)). 
 191. See id. at 2491 (citing Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373).  
 192. Id. at 2493. 
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Mensing,193 which she refers to as an “outlier.”194 There, the Court found 
that there was “impossibility” preemption on the basis that a generic 
manufacturer could not offer product warnings that would conform to 
Minnesota’s duty-to-warn without altering the FDA-approved drug label. In 
Justice Sotomayor’s view, however, even PLIVA does not pre-ordain the 
Bartlett majority’s conclusion for the same reasons: the defendant could 
choose either not to market the product, or to compensate injured 
plaintiffs.195  
Returning to her policy rationale, Justice Sotomayor concludes her 
dissent by pointing out that Congress has not only spoken to the issue of 
state law preemption in other contexts, but that Congress has also 
responded “when it believes state tort law may compromise significant 
federal objectives.”196 Justice Sotomayor points to state vaccination laws, 
also subject to pre-market approval, to illustrate her point.197 Pursuant to 
early FDA vaccination policy, once the FDA approves the vaccine, 
compensation for vaccine-induced injuries was left to the states.198 In 1986, 
Congress was concerned about an increase in state law tort litigation, and 
thus responded by enacting a National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.199  
Among Congress’s provisions was a hallmark no-fault compensation 
scheme to compensate victims of vaccine-related injuries or death.200 
According to Justice Sotomayor, Congress has thus demonstrated the 
willingness and ability to act when it believes that state tort law operates to 
the detriment of federal objectives.201 By imposing preemption in Bartlett 
without congressional action, the Court leaves the intent of Congress 
unspoken, and leaves injured consumers without recourse.202 
 
C.     Analysis of Bartlett in Light of PLIVA 
 
 
 193. See id. at 2482–83 (recognizing that PLIVA expanded the scope of impossibility 
preemption to immunize generic drug manufacturers from state-law failure-to-warn claims). 
 194. Id. at 2486. 
 195. Id. at 2489 (discussing that New Hampshire did not require Mutual to do anything other 
than compensate consumers who were injured). 
 196. Id. at 2496.  
 197. Id. at 2495–96 (discussing how vaccine-related injuries were addressed largely by the 
states before the enactment of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act).  
 198. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1072 (2011) (discussing the history of 
state run vaccine-induced injury compensation programs). 
 199. Id. at 1073. 
 200. Id. (discussing provisions within the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act that 
establishes a no-fault compensation program, which allows a person injured by a vaccine to file a 
petition for compensation). 
 201. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2496 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 202. See id. (discussing the loss that Bartlett must bear due to preemption). 
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In this split decision, the 5-justice majority extended the logic of 
PLIVA to claims of design-defect.203  In PLIVA, the Court had previously 
found that failure-to-warn “defects” were preempted by the FDCA because 
of the FDCA’s prohibition on behalf of the generic in changing the brand’s 
label.204 The design of the label is part of the design of the drug, and the 
failure-to-warn is a failure of the label, which is a flaw of the drug itself.205 
Thus, the majority did not note a viable distinction between a label’s 
failure-to-warn and a design-defect based upon the failed label. 
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, while thoughtful, requires that PLIVA be 
repudiated.206  There is no logic that would allow PLIVA to stand and for 
Bartlett to fail, and her sympathy for the case at hand doesn’t fix the gap in 
logic.  It is doubtless why Justice Breyer declined to join, instead deciding 
to issue his own dissent that was short and pragmatic. Just because the FDA 
approved a product doesn’t end the inquiry; if the product was flawed (by 
design or by label) and a manufacturer chose to market it anyway, the 
manufacturer should be liable for damages.207 
In many respects, the “impossibility” defense is at the heart of both 
PLIVA and Bartlett.  It was “impossible” for the generic manufacturer to 
change the drug’s label.208 Failure to adjust the label to meet state law 
(New Hampshire, for Bartlett) was a violation of state tort principles.209 
Ergo, there is a conflict between state and federal law, and the Supremacy 
Clause dictates that federal law preempts the incompatible state law.210 The 
fact that the generic might have gone back to the FDA and requested a 
stronger label, or the fact that a stronger label specifically identifying the 
 
 203. See id. at 2478 (majority opinion) (citing PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 
(2011)) (explaining how the “stop-selling” argument affects the Court’s rationale). 
 204. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2580–81 (2011).  
 205. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998) (discussing 
product defect including defective labels); see also Chatnam v. Pfizer, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 2d 641, 
648 (S.D. Miss. 2013) (discussing the plaintiff’s claim that the drug’s “defect” is in the 
information, which did not accompany the drug, and determining that these allegations can only 
relate to the drug’s labeling and as such, are allegations that make up a failure-to-warn claim). 
 206. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2482 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority 
incorrectly extended its holding in Mensing). 
 207. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 608 (2009) (discussing the manufacturer’s continuing 
obligations following FDA approval of a drug). 
 208. Id. at 2476–77 (discussing the majority’s holding that federal law prevents generic drug 
manufacturers from changing their labels, and that when federal law forbids an action, the state 
law is preempted). 
 209. Id. at 2475 (discussing the duty imposed on Mutual to strengthen labels based on the 
state’s design-defect cause of action).  
 210. Id. at 2470 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)) (discussing the 
effect of the Supremacy Clause on state laws that require a private party to violate federal law). 
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type of injury suffered by Ms. Bartlett was later approved is legally without 
consequence; at the time of injury, neither had actually occurred.211 
Having dismissed the idea that liability could be found on the basis of 
an ill-designed label, either directly or indirectly, the only remaining option 
for the Bartlett and PLIVA defendants would be to make a business 
judgment: what is the expected (liability) cost of marketing the product as 
is, and can the manufacturer charge a reasonable price in view of the 
expected liability? The majority rejected this “stop selling” option as “all 
but meaningless” for both PLIVA and Bartlett, concluding that if 
impossibility preemption were to have any meaning at all, it would not be 
to simply tell victims that there is no recourse in the law.212 
The Breyer dissent, rather than attempting to distinguish PLIVA,213 
quotes two former FDA commissioners, who stated that “the FDA has long 
believed that state tort litigation can ‘supplemen[t] the agency’s regulatory 
and enforcement activities’” in support of Justice Breyer’s conclusion that 
paying damages in the nature of strict liability is a viable option.214 The 
majority and two dissenting opinions seem to agree that discerning the 
intent of Congress is key,215 but disagree on what Congress would 
conclude.216 All agree that Wyeth v. Levine reflects congressional intent that 
FDA regulation should be supplemented with state tort law, both as a check 
on the federal approval process and as a means of compensation.217 The 
Breyer dissent would extend the logic to generics: “Tort suits can help fill 
the gaps in federal regulation by ‘serv[ing] as a catalyst’ to identify 
 
 211. See Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 731 F. Supp. 2d 135, 144 (D.N.H. 2010) (explaining that 
the adequacy of warnings must be judged in light of the facts at the time of injury, without the 
benefit of hindsight). 
 212. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2477 (discussing the Court of Appeals’ reasoning that 
manufacturers could comply with federal- and state- law by stop-selling the product, which the 
Court found unsatisfactory); see also PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2579 (2011) 
(explaining that the Supremacy Clause does not permit an approach to preemption, such as stop-
selling, that renders conflict preemption all but meaningless). 
 213. At oral argument and in response to Justice Breyer, counsel for Bartlett argued that there 
was a distinction between adequacy of the warning (not argued) and efficacy of the warning 
(argued), which minimized the risk of Sulindac. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35–37, Bartlett, 
133 S. Ct. 2466 (No. 12–142). 
 214. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2482 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Brief 
for Donald Kennedy & David A. Kessler as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Bartlett, 133 
S. Ct. 2466 (No. 12-142)). 
 215. Id. at 2486 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing the need for inquiry into congressional 
intent). 
 216. Id. at 2480 (majority opinion) (discussing the need for explicit resolution of the 
preemption question by Congress due to divergent views on the issue). 
 217. See 555 U.S. 555, 574–75 (2009) (discussing congressional silence on the issue of state 
tort law as evidence that Congress did not intend for FDA oversight to be the exclusive means of 
ensuring drug safety).   
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previously unknown dangers.”218  The majority, however, noting the 
critical distinction between brand-name drugs and generics, denies that 
Congress intended for the logic of Levine to extend to generic 
counterparts.219 The majority concludes that the jurisprudence of 
impossibility, coupled with absence of congressional activity following 
PLIVA, evinces the intent of Congress that brand and generics be treated 
differently.220 It may be on this point that Justices Breyer and Kagan, also 
dissenting, declined to join Sotomayor, as it is impossible to reconcile the 
logic of a different conclusion with PLIVA.  
It is not unusual for the FDA to approve a generic drug, only to 
discover latent safety issues after it has been on the market.221 Despite the 
FDA’s official position as articulated in its amicus curiae brief, former 
FDA commissioners Donald Kennedy and David Kessler support the 
imposition of state tort liability as a means of supplementing FDA efforts to 
ferret out unsafe products.222 Kennedy and Kessler cite the agency’s lack of 
adequate resources to effectively police the drug market, which is part of 
the FDA’s core mission.223 Opponents speculate that some state tort laws 
would render the marketing of generics prohibitively expensive, which 
would be complicated by complex distribution systems that make it difficult 
to sell in some states but not others.224  It is doubtless that FDA preemption 
of state tort claims affects cost, and a change in the law would presumably 
result in a price increase for generic products.225  
 
D.     The FDA Proposes New Labeling Requirements 
 
 
 218. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2485 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original) 
(quoting Bates v. Dow Argosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 451 (2005)). 
 219. See id. at 2480 (majority opinion) (explaining that a lack of a preemption clause leaves the 
Court to discern congressional intent from the FDCA). 
 220. See id. (discussing Congress’ lack of activity); id. at 2478 (discussing the impossibility 
issue). 
 221. Brief of Former FDA Commissioners Dr. Donald Kennedy and Dr. David Kellers as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8, Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (No. 12-142) (discussing that 
FDA approval of a drug is not a guarantee that the drug will not cause serious adverse effects at a 
later date). 
 222. Id. at 6 (discussing the indispensable role that state tort litigation plays in achieving the 
congressional goal of the FDCA). 
 223. Id. at 12 (discussing the various conditions faced by the FDA that limit the agency’s 
ability to singlehandedly monitor all of the drugs available on the market). 
 224. Brief for Generic Pharmaceutical Association as Amicus Curiae In Support of Petitioner 
at 29–31, Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (No. 12-142) (discussing the negative impact that state tort 
laws will have on the market for manufacturing generic drugs). 
 225. Id. (discussing the rise in generic drug prices as a result of state tort laws). 
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 Just days after the Court’s decision in Bartlett, the FDA released its 
most recent government agenda that includes new rules under consideration 
by various government agencies.226 Included in that agenda was the FDA’s 
intent to raise the issue of a revision to its labeling requirements for generic 
drug makers.227 The FDA intends to publish a proposed rule that allows 
generic drug makers to make changes to product labels, independent of a 
brand-name manufacturer. This rule would empower generic companies to 
notify consumers about safety risks and concerns they become aware of, 
supporters say. In turn, it could potentially make generic drug makers liable 
in court for failing to do so.228  
If, in fact, the FDA does consider and issue new rules revising its 
labeling requirements, such rules would be at odds with the position of the 
United States as amicus curiae, which supports Mutual’s position against 
FDA preemption: 
 
The Court need not decide whether the FDCA would 
preempt a “pure” design-defect claim that does not consider 
the adequacy of labeling. That issue is  difficult and close, 
with several factors weighing in favor of finding no 
preemption. The government nevertheless concludes that 
the FDCA would preempt a pure design defect claim 
where, as here, the claim does not require the plaintiff to 
prove that the manufacturer knew or should have known of 
new and scientifically significant evidence that rendered 
the drug “misbranded” under federal law.229 
 
A small point of agreement among the Bartlett parties, amici, and the 
Supreme Court is that the Court’s latest ruling is to be narrowly drawn and 
construed, answering only the issue of whether a judgment based upon a 
design-defect claim against a generic manufacturer can stand.230  The 
 
 226. Thomas M. Burton, FDA Rule to Expose Generic Drug Makers to Liability, WALL ST. J. 
(July 3, 2013, 6:41 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324399404578584142169099794.html. 
 227. Id.  
 228. FDA to Allow Generic Drugmakers to Make Label Changes Independent of Innovators, 
DRUG INDUSTRY DAILY, http://www.fdanews.com/articles/156914-fda-to-allow-generic-
drugmakers-to-make-label-changes-independent-of-innovators (last visited Nov. 13, 2014).  
 229. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12, Bartlett, 133 S. 
Ct. 2466 (12-142). 
 230. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (holding that design-defect claims, like New Hampshire’s, 
that place a duty to alter composition or labeling for safety requirements conflict with federal law, 
and therefore cannot stand); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18, Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (No. 12-
142) (asserting that the Supreme Court is tasked with deciding whether precedent would be 
expanded to preempt state law design-defect claims); Brief of John and Tammy Gilbert et al. as 
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broader question of whether state tort liability should be employed as “a 
complementary form of drug regulation”231 was saved for another day, and 
it appears that such a day will at least be scheduled for debate. 
The stated purpose of the FDA’s proposed rules is to “create parity” 
between brand name drug manufacturers and generic manufacturers, 
allowing generics to alter the drug label to include information (including 
warnings) specific to the generic product.232  In so doing, the presumption 
is that generic manufacturers would avoid the pitfalls and protections of 
Bartlett and PLIVA, assuming responsibility for their label, and thus the 
liability as well.233  Of course, the devil of the proposed change is in the 
details, and the FDA will also be cognizant of the costs and incentives 
involved with bringing generic products to market.234  Moreover, if the 
FDA’s goal is to “create parity,” then it can be expected that interested 
parties will raise the issue of parity between FDA-approved drugs and 
medical devices, particularly since there are a growing number of 
therapeutics where the distinction between drug and device is increasingly 
blurred.235   
 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 22, Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (No. 12-142) (stating that 
the Supreme Court has previously always held narrow circumscription of conflict preemption 
based on impossibility); Brief of the Council of State Governments as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Respondent at 19–20, Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (No. 12-142) (noting that unlike previous 
decisions involving failure-to-warn claims, the present case involved the issue of whether federal 
law preempts design-defect claims).  
 231. Brief for the United States, supra note 229, at 34 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 
578 (2009)). 
 232. Burton, supra note 226. 
 233. See Toni Clark & Andrew Hay, FDA Defends Generic Drug Label Proposal at U.S. 
House Hearing, REUTERS (April 1, 2014, 6:58 PM), 
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failure-to-warn against risk, and the FDA now would “unshackle” these manufacturers, exposing 
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 234. See Kurt R. Karst, Generic Drug Labeling Preemption: The Flavor of the Day, FDA LAW 
BLOG (March 10, 2014), 
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Impact Analysis addressing some cost concerns raised by lawmakers, and argued that the change 
would incentivize generic manufacturers to warn of safety risks). 
 235. See Lisa M. Mottes, The Need For Federal Preemption of State Tort Claims in the 
Context of "New Drugs" and Premarket-Approved Medical Devices, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 723, 
725 (2011) (stating that a call for safety has been initiated as a result of these cases and Congress 
has indicated there should be a uniform standard of no preemption).  Consider, for example, 
nanomedicine—the application of nanotechnology to medicine—which enables the development 
of drug carriers that passively target tumors and deliver and dispense chemotherapeutics for 
cancer treatment. See Frederick A. Fielder & Glenn H. Reynolds, Legal Problems of 
Nanotechnology: An Overview, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 593, 607–08 (1993-1994) (describing 
how nanotechnology-based treatments do not fit neatly into the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act’s definitions of either “drug” or “device”); see also Jennifer H. Grossman & Scott E. McNeil, 
  







IV.     FDA PREEMPTION AND MEDICAL DEVICES 
 
A.     Express Preemption: Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. 
 
As discussed earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court treats drugs and medical 
devices differently with respect to federal preemption of state product 
liability laws.236 In the 2008 matter of Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,237 the 
Court found that the FDCA, including its Medical Device Amendments 
(“MDA”),238 provides the exclusive enforcement mechanism to establish 
the safety of medical devices “approved” by the FDA.239  Thus, the MDA 
arguably creates express240 preemption for medical devices by statute, 
rebutting the usual presumption against federal preemption of state law for 
matters involving consumer health and safety:  
 
(a) General Rule 
 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State of 
political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with 
respect to a device intended for human use any requirement— 
 
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement under 
this chapter to the device, and 
 
 
Nanotechnology in Cancer Medicine, 65 PHYSICS TODAY, Aug. 2012, at 38, 38 (Aug. 2012) 
(explaining how nanotechnology is applied to medicine to enable the development of drug carriers 
that passively target tumors and deliver and dispense chemotherapeutics for cancer treatment).  
 236. See supra Part I. 
 237. 552 U.S. 312 (2008). 
 238. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2012).  
 239. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 323–24 (stating that federal requirements specific to a medical 
device preempts common-law causes of action for negligence and strict liability (citing Medtronic, 
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 512 (1996)). 
 240. See Indus. Truck. Ass’n v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that in 
the past, federal courts have recognized three types of preemption: express, field, and conflict, the 
latter two categories being subcategories of implied preemption). 
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(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any 
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this 
chapter.241 (Emphasis added.) 
 
Some courts have interpreted the phrase “different from, or in addition 
to” only in reference to the duty of care, precluding the imposition of a 
higher state-law duty, but allowing state-law damages to be “tacked on”;242 
other courts have interpreted it to preclude either a higher duty of care or 
additional (state law) damages.243 
While acknowledging the important rationale for vesting the FDA with 
exclusive authority over the approval process for drugs and medical 
devices, there remains, of course, the other side to the story. The FDA is 
equipped with a broad range of enforcement mechanisms for 
noncompliance with the MDA.244 Once again, however, none of these 
enforcement mechanisms include a private right of action that would enable 
an injured plaintiff to be compensated for her injury.245 The resultant shield 
not only denies reasonable redress to an injured plaintiff, but it also negates 
an important incentive for manufacturers to address the dangers posed by 
the use of their devices. It also provides a disincentive for becoming 
forthcoming and transparent about known or reasonably anticipated 
risks.246 
In Riegel, the plaintiffs brought a damages action under New York law 
alleging that the catheter that ruptured in the lead plaintiff’s coronary artery 
was inflated to a pressure that was higher than the Class III label indicated, 
 
 241. 21 U.S.C. § 360(k).  
 242. See, e.g., Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330 (holding that states are not prevented from providing a 
damages remedy on the basis of a violation of FDA regulations); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 
U.S. 470, 495 (1996) (holding that the MDA does not deny states the right to prove traditional 
damages remedy for violations of duties parallel to federal requirements); Chambers v. Osteonics 
Corp., 109 F.3d 1243, 1248 (1997) (holding that a negligence claim for violating FDA regulations 
could be upheld because it did not impose greater requirements that the FDA itself imposed). 
 243. See, e.g., Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 28–29 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the 
language broadly preempts any state tort law, regardless of whether the manufacturer has in fact 
complied with the federal standard). 
 244. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 333–335c (2006) (listing penalties—
criminal, civil, and regulatory—for noncompliance).  
 245. Id. (including criminal, civil, and regulatory penalties, but lacking a provision for a 
private right of action). 
 246. James W. Matthew et al., New FDA Rule on Drug Labeling May Mean Increased 
Exposure and an Uncertain Path for Generic Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 81 DEF. COUNS. J. 
306, 309 (2014) (quoting Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved 
Drugs and Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985, 67,988–89 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013)) 
(stating that generic drug manufacturers lack incentives to comply with FDA requirements and to 
maintain current safety information for their products).   
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which was approved by the FDA.247  The plaintiffs’ state-law products 
liability action alleged that the catheter was defective.248 The Supreme 
Court in Riegel denied the claim, finding that the MDA expressly 
preempted the plaintiffs’ state law claim because it would impose a 
standard of care that is greater than the safety requirements required by 
federal (FDA) regulations.249  The defendant argued that under such 
circumstances, the legislature, in enacting the MDA, believed that it would 
be counter-productive to require manufacturers to be beholden to multiple 
different state-specific tort law regimes, some of which imposed a duty 
greater than the FDA.250   
The Riegel Court thus concluded, specifically pursuant to the MDA, 
that a product, having been approved by the FDA, could not be held to a 
state law standard that was “different from, or in addition to” the standard 
set forth under federal law.251  In so holding, however, the Court expressly 
reaffirmed its 1996 holding in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr252 that § 510 K of the 
MDA (which states that medical devices can be “cleared” pursuant to a less 
onerous approval standard for devices substantially equivalent to a pre-
existing device) does not preclude “traditional damages remed[ies] for 
common law duties when those duties parallel federal requirements.”253  
The critical point is that the state law damages sought in Lohr (but not 
Riegel) were based upon a standard that was consistent with, and parallel 
to, the standards required under federal law.254   
While Riegel found, pursuant to the MDA, that liability under state 
law for the alleged product defect would be denied, the issue continues to 
linger.  In particular, several subsequent federal courts have attempted to 
parse the scope of “implied” preemption in deciding whether all state law 
claims are preempted, or just those that are “different from, or in addition 
to” those available under the federal law.255  Riegel, which spoke to express 
 
 247. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 320 (2008) (stating that the plaintiffs, husband 
and wife, brought suit for injuries to the husband allegedly caused by a defective catheter). 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 325. 
 250. Brief for Respondent at 42–43, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (No. 06-
179) (arguing that Congress enacted a uniform federal regulatory framework to shield device 
manufacturers from conflicting regulatory requirements and from liability for devices that the 
FDA has found safe and effective).  
 251. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 325. 
 252. 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
 253. Id. at 495. 
 254. Id. (asserting that nothing in § 360(k) denies Florida the ability to provide a damages 
remedy, even if it is literally different from the federal rules, as it is not an additional or different 
requirement and only serves to provide more incentive to comply with federal rules).  
 255. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 323, 330. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 
(2001) (dismissing a state law claim for failure to make a parallel claim); Carrelo v. Advanced 
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preemption, arguably left open the possibility that a tort claim could be 
brought under principles of implied preemption as to a state law that 
“parallels” federal law, which does not impose duties that are “different 
from, or in addition to” those available pursuant to federal law.256 In Lohr, 
Justice Breyer emphasized this point in his concurrence, noting that he did 
not “find any indication that either Congress or the FDA intended the 
relevant FDA regulations to occupy entirely any relevant field.”257  
Latching onto this distinction, a number of cases have been brought in 
federal courts that interpreted Riegel, Lohr, and a third opinion, Buckman 
Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee,258 regarding implied preemption.259   
 
B.     Implied Preemption: Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee 
 
In many respects, the preemption issue continues to surface because 
the Riegel Court, while clearly articulating the principles of “express” 
preemption of medical devices pursuant to § 360(k) of the MDA, left open 
the scope (and thus limits) of the so-called “implied” preemption.260 The 
U.S. Supreme Court in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee 
previously addressed this nuance in great detail,261 but its interpretation has 
subsequently been disputed.262   
In Buckman, the plaintiffs claimed that their injuries were a result of 
bone screws that had been used on their spines.263 They brought a civil 
action in federal court against Buckman Co., a consulting company that 
assisted the manufacturer of the screws in “navigating the federal regulatory 
 
Neuromodulation Sys., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d 303 (D.P.R. 2011) (avoiding preemption by 
successfully pleading a failure-to-warn, a parallel claim); Covert v. Stryker Corp., No. 
1:08CV447, 2009 WL 2424559, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2009) (discussing cases upholding and 
denying preemption post-Riegel).  
 256. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330 (holding that parallel claims cannot add to federal requirements 
and must be “premised” on FDA regulations). 
 257. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 508 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
 258. 531 U.S. 341 (2001). 
 259. See infra Part IV.C. 
 260. See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text. 
 261. See 531 U.S. at 347–48 (holding that state law fraud on the FDA claims were impliedly 
preempted by federal law).  
 262. Compare Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 98 (2d Cir. 2006) (allowing 
parallel claims if the cause of action alleges a state claim other than fraud, by interpreting 
Buckman’s holding to limit claims which “solely” assign liability on the basis of fraud), with 
Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding implied preemption 
“on the basis of state court findings of fraud,” but allowing the claim when a state “chooses to 
incorporate a federal standard into its law of torts . . . when the federal agency itself determines 
that fraud marred the regulatory-approval process”). 
 263. 531 U.S. at 344. 
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process for [those] devices.” 264 The plaintiffs alleged that Buckman had 
made fraudulent representations to the FDA and that “but for” the false 
representations, they would not have been injured.265  The District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the plaintiffs’ so-called 
“fraud-on-the-FDA” claims on the ground that they were preempted by the 
MDA.266  A divided panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 
concluding that there was no preemption.267  On appeal to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the Buckman majority reversed the circuit panel, finding 
preemption on the basis that the claims under state law must “inevitably 
conflict” with the FDA’s obligation to police this type of fraud.268 
Furthermore, allowing this type of claim could impose a chilling effect on 
the pre- and post-marketing information provided to the FDA, resulting in 
the FDA being hampered in its efforts to evaluate applications for 
approval.269  A concurring opinion emphasized the plaintiffs’ inability to 
establish the “but for” causation that they alleged.270 
Among the current controversy within the circuits is the reach of 
Buckman’s implied preemption for claims of “fraud-on-the-FDA.”  
Specifically, the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits271 have since ruled that 
Buckman only preempts specific fraud-on-the-FDA claims where such 
claims interfere with the exclusive authority of the FDA to enforce matters 
pursuant to the FDCA.272 Those that interpret Buckman to preempt all state 
court actions would preclude all traditional failure-to-warn and warranty 
claims when the alleged action violates a matter that the FDCA 
regulates.273  Those that interpret Buckman more narrowly find that so-
called “parallel” state claims are not preempted.274 Parallel state claims are 
those that impose the same duties of care on the defendant—they merely 
add a state law damage action for failure to comply with the federal duty.275  
 
 264. Id.  
 265. Id. at 347. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 347, 350. 
 269. Id. at 349–51. 
 270. Id. at 354 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
 271. See Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013); Hughes v. Boston 
Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2011); Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
 272. See infra Part IV.C. 
 273. See infra text accompanying notes 297–316 (discussing cases that held that state failure-
to-warn claims are preempted by federal law). 
 274. See infra text accompanying notes 317–35 (discussing cases which narrowly interpreted 
Buckman and held that some parallel state claims are not preempted). 
 275. Easterling v. Cardiac Pacemakers, 986 F. Supp. 366, 371  (E.D. La. 1997) (citing 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)). 
  
34 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 18:1 






any claim based on the [federally regulated devices’] 
construction or composition, design, warnings, or express 
warranties would each specifically impose requirements 
different from or in addition to the FDA-approved 
requirements for the device.276 
 
Such cases asserted state law tort theories such as failure-to-warn, 
manufacturing defects, breach of implied warranty, fraud, 
misrepresentation, etc.277 To date, several cases have reached the U.S. 
Court of Appeals and the legal conclusions are mixed.278 In light of the 
deep split of opinion among the circuit courts, the issue is poised to 
precipitate a definitive review by the U.S. Supreme Court.279   
 














One of the most recent cases to weigh in on the scope of implied 
preemption under Riegel, Lohr, and Buckman is a 2013 decision from the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Stengel v. Medtronic 
Inc.280 In Stengel, the FDA had issued pre-marketing approval for 
implantable pain pumps and catheters that are used to deliver medication to 
a surgical site in the vicinity of the spinal cord.281  Richard Stengel was a 
patient who had a Medtronic pump and catheter inserted, but soon thereafter 
 
 276. Hinkel v. St. Jude Med., S.C., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 739, 747 (E.D. La. 2012).  
 277. See Covert v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:08CV447, 2009 WL 2424559, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 
5, 2009) (listing cases that have held preemption of state law claims). 
 278. Compare Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1228–32 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that the Lohr, Buckman, and Riegel Supreme Court decisions do not preempt parallel state claims), 
and Howard v. Zimmer, Inc., 711 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that a parallel fraud claim 
was properly raised), and Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(reversing a lower court decision, stating that the plaintiff successfully raised a parallel fraud 
claim not preempted by federal law), and Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that a state action based on an alleged violation of federal law is not preempted), with 
Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a state fraud on the 
FDA cause of action was preempted).  
 279. See infra Part IV.C.  
 280. 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 281. Id. at 1227. 
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lost strength and sensation in his legs.282 Although testing was done to 
determine the cause, Stengel’s treating physician did not timely seek or 
detect the presence of a granuloma that was ultimately determined to have 
caused Stengel’s then-permanent paraplegia.283 Meanwhile, the FDA, in 
conducting a routine audit, discovered numerous unreported adverse events 
concerning this pump and catheter—including granulomas—and issued a 
“Warning Letter” to Medtronic, thus requiring Medtronic to distribute 
urgent warning letters to physicians who were using the products.284 
Medtronic was subsequently also forced to issue supplemental warnings 
before the FDA eventually recalled the products.285 
Stengel alleged that had his physician been timely notified by 
Medtronic of its post-marketing discovery of dangerous granulomas as 
required by the FDA, his physician would have tested for granuloma and 
Stengel’s permanent injury would have been avoided.286 Medtronic 
countered that Stengel’s lawsuit is exactly the type of state tort claim 
contemplated under Riegel’s preemption doctrine: Arizona’s damages 
provision would impose a legal standard that is “different from, or in 
addition to” the FDA’s pre-marketing approval process of the pump and 
catheter, the very criteria set forth in Riegel.287 
The unanimous en banc court in Stengel288 (overturning an earlier 
opinion of a 3-judge panel) examined Riegel and the MDA to conclude that 
“[s]tate requirements are preempted under the MDA only to the extent that 
they are ‘different from, or in addition to’ the requirements imposed by 
federal law.”289 Thus, the court interpreted these cases to allow “parallel” 
state damage claims that that are neither different from nor in addition to 
those of the FDCA.290 The court relied substantially upon the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,291 which found that § 360(k) of 
the MDA does not preclude “traditional” common law tort remedies to the 
extent that they are not inconsistent with federal requirements.292 The 
Stengel court found that there was enough ambiguity in the Lohr, Buckman, 
 
 282. Id. 
 283. Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 676 F.3d 1159, 1161 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 284. Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1227. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Stengel, 676 F.3d at 1161. 
 287. Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1226, 1230. 
 288. Id. at 1226. Initially, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held (2-1) 
for Medtronic. Stengel was then granted a rehearing en banc, in which the court reversed and 
remanded the decision of the three-judge panel. Id.  
 289. Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1230 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360(k)(a)(1)). 
 290. Id. at 1226. 
 291. 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
 292. See id. at 491 (explaining that a sweeping preemption of  “traditional” common-law 
remedies was not intended by the legislature). 
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and Riegel precedent to avoid concluding that Congress and the FDA 
intended to “deprive the States of any role in protecting consumers from the 
dangers inherent in many medical devices.”293 
Latching on to this distinction between express and implied 
preemption, the en banc Ninth Circuit allowed the plaintiff to bring his 
state-law “failure to warn” claims for injuries resulting from an FDA-
approved medical device.294 The court specifically limited its reach to 
circumstances where state law does not impose safety requirements that are 
“different from, or in addition to” those required by the FDA.295  In so 
concluding, the Stengel court commented:  
 
Given the ambiguities in the statute and the scope of the 
preclusion that would occur otherwise . . . we cannot accept 
Medtronic’s argument that . . . Congress clearly signaled its 
intent to deprive the States of any role in protecting 
consumers from the dangers inherent in many medical 
devices.296 
 
On this preemption issue, Stengel stands substantially in unison with 
the MDA cases in the Fifth and Seventh circuits, which decided that parallel 
state-law claims are not preempted.297 In Hughes v. Boston Scientific 
Corp.,298 for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that 
Boston Scientific’s alleged negligent failure to report “serious injuries” and 
“malfunctions” of the device as required by the FDA (and deemed negligent 
under Mississippi state tort law) would not be preempted.299 The Fifth 
Circuit held similarly in Bass v. Stryker,300 stating that negligence claims 
premised upon failure-to-warn claims would be preempted, but not those 
based upon negligence in manufacturing.301 Similarly, in Bausch v. Stryker 
Corp.,302 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the alleged 
 
 293. Stengel, 704 F.3d at 123 (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 489). 
 294. Id. at 1233–34. 
 295. Id. at 1233. 
 296. Id. (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 489).  
 297. See Gomez v. St. Jude Med. Daig Div. Inc., 442 F.3d 919, 932 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that the Louisiana statute went beyond scope of federal requirements, and related claims were 
preempted); Chambers v. Osteonics Corp., 107 F.3d 1243, 1249 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the 
Indiana negligence claim was not preempted by the MDA). 
 298. 631 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 299. Id. at 771. 
 300. 669 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 301. Id. at 518.  
 302. 630 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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defective manufacture of a device in violation of the MDA’s manufacturing 
regulations would not be preempted.303 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Howard v. Zimmer, Inc.304 
reached a similar conclusion despite a circuitous procedural route.305 
Howard’s initial appeal occurred in the Sixth Circuit through multidistrict 
litigation, but eventually landed in the Tenth Circuit, which certified the 
preemption question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.306 Howard involved 
a knee replacement (implant) that supposedly failed, and required removal 
due to the implant’s inability to bond with the plaintiff’s bone.307 The 
purported cause of the failure was an oily residue left on the device, which 
was in violation of the manufacturing standards required by the FDA.308 
The plaintiff alleged that the violation of the manufacturing standard 
constituted negligence per se.309  Although the defendant urged that 
negligence per se cannot be predicated upon violation of a regulation 
(instead of a statute), the Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed.310 It 
established that (1) Oklahoma law does permit a private party (plaintiff) to 
assert a parallel claim for negligence per se, and (2) negligence per se can 
be based upon violation of a regulation when the enforcement of the 
regulation falls within the function of a governmental entity.311 
 In contrast to Stengel, Hughes, Bausch, and Howard, appellate 
courts in the Sixth and Eighth circuits issued opinions that were somewhat 
at odds with the narrow interpretation of their sister circuits.312  In Garcia 
v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs,313 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that 
Buckman prohibits reliance on findings of the state court to establish that a 
defendant manufacturer misrepresented or withheld important safety data 
 
 303. Id. at 552. 
 304. 718 F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 305. See Howard v. Zimmer, Inc., 299 P.3d 463, 466 (Okla. 2013) (describing the case as 
involving a “long and tortured litigation trail”).   
 306. Id.  
 307. Id. at 465–66; see also id. at 466 n.6 (explaining that although “Zimmer, Inc.” is the 
defendant in the case, the name “Sulzer” was used to describe the manufacturer throughout the 
litigation). 
 308. Howard, 299 P.3d at 466. The pre-marketing approval application for this Class III device 
required specific manufacturing procedures to “ensure that it is removed or limited to an amount 
that does not adversely affect the device’s quality.” 21 C.F.R. § 820.70(h) (2014). 
 309. Howard, 299 P.3d at 466. 
 310. Id. at 469, 472. 
 311. Id. at 471–73. 
 312. See Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that the duty-to-warn 
claim was not preempted); Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc., 273 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
the failure-to-warn and manufacturer’s instructions claims were preempted); Kemp v. Medtronic, 
Inc., 231 F.3d 216 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that negligence per se, fraud, and failure-to-warn 
claims were preempted). 
 313. 385 F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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from the FDA.314  Though not entirely on point, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability 
Litigation315 characterized the claims under state law, which stated that the 
FDA was not provided with adequate information, and were “simply an 
attempt by private parties to enforce the MDA.”316   
Since early 2013, a number of lower courts,317 several in the Ninth 
circuit,318 and the Oklahoma Supreme Court319 have followed the Stengel 
precedent.320 For example, the federal district court for the central district 
of California followed Stengel in the matter of Simmons v. Boston Scientific 
Corp. et al.321 In Simmons, a defibrillator allegedly malfunctioned, causing 
injury to the plaintiff.322  The defendants, of course, argued that the 
plaintiff’s claim was preempted under Riegel and the MDA.323 In an effort 
to overcome Riegel preemption, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants 
also violated parallel state law duties, including failure-to-warn, pursuant to 
the recent Stengel precedent.324 The district court recognized that in the 
absence of Stengel, Riegel preemption likely would have prevailed since the 
defendant argued it would be required to “give warnings to patients or 
physicians different from or broader than those required by FDA 
regulations.”325 Although the Simmons court recognized that the plaintiff’s 
claims might now prevail under Stengel, the plaintiffs ultimately failed 
anyway on procedural grounds.326 
The split among the circuits concerning the scope of MDA preemption 
focuses squarely on the issue of whether both implied preemption under the 
 
 314. Id. at 966; see also Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc., 405 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a 
claim of negligence per se would be preempted under the MDA). 
 315. 623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 316. Id. at 1205–06. 
 317. See Messner v. Medtronic, Inc., 975 N.Y.S.2d 367 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (unpublished 
opinion); Burgos v. Satiety, Inc., No. 10-CV-2680 (MKB), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31062, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y., March 5, 2013). 
 318. See Perez v. Nidek Co., 711 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2013); Phelps v. Wyeth, Inc., 938 F.  
Supp. 2d 1055 (D. Or. 2013); Elliot v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 112-CV-0070-EJL-MHW, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59072, at *1 (D. Idaho, June 11, 2013). 
 319. See Howard v. Zimmer, Inc., 299 P.3d 463 (Okla. 2013); see also supra notes 304–11 and 
accompanying text. 
 320. Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 321. No. CV 12-7962 PA (FFMx), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45852, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 
2013). 
 322. Id. at *1–2. 
 323. Id. at *6–7. 
 324. Id. at *13–14. 
 325. See id. at *9–10 (explaining that Stengel allows state claims that are broader than those 
required by FDA if those state claims are based on the defendant’s failure-to-warn the FDA of the 
adverse health consequences of its medical device).  
 326. Id. at *14, *16. 
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rationale set forth in Buckman, (“this sort of litigation would exert an 
extraneous pull on the scheme established by Congress and is therefore pre-
empted”327) and express preemption under Riegel (the FDA “may . . .  
approve devices that present great risks if they nonetheless offer great 
benefits in light of the available alternatives”328) leaves room for the 
“parallel” cause of action identified in Stengel, Hughes, and Bausch.329   
Riley v. Cordis Corp.,330 a federal district court opinion from the 
district of Minnesota, provides a thoughtful interpretation of Buckman, 
Lohr, and Riegel, concluding that there is only a “narrow gap” of medical 
device cases that would survive MDA preemption.331 Specifically, the court 
determined that “[t]he plaintiff must be suing for conduct that violates the 
FDCA (or else his claim is expressly preempted by § 360(k)(a)), but the 
plaintiff must not be suing because the conduct violates the FDCA (since 
such a claim would be impliedly preempted under Buckman).”332  So, for 
example, parallel state law claims that allege misrepresentation or 
nondisclosure (whether fraudulent or negligent) might fit through the Riley 
“narrow gap” since “the state-law claim is in substance . . . a claim for 
violating the FDCA—that is, when the state claim would not exist if the 
FDCA did not exist.”333 Furthermore, Riley decided that state law claims 
“premised on conduct that both (1) violates the FDCA and (2) would give 
rise to a recovery under state law even in the absence of the FDCA” may 
survive preemption under Buckman.334  The courts in the Hughes, Bausch, 
and Stengel cases may have gone further, finding that so-called parallel 
state-law damage claims are not preempted, except to the extent that they 
clearly assert “fraud on the FDA.”335  
 
V.     MDA, PREEMPTION, AND OFF-LABEL USE OF MEDICAL DEVICES 
 
 
 327. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353 (2001).  
 328. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 318 (2008).  
 329. See Jean M. Eggen, Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis: Preemption of Medical 
Device "Parallel Claims", 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 159, 184–86, 208–09 (2013) (citing 
Stengel, Hughes and Bausch as examples of circuit court cases in which parallel manufacturing 
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A related issue that is yet unresolved is whether off-label uses of 
medical devices would survive MDA preemption.336  On the one hand, 
Buckman contemplated the burden that manufacturers face in seeking 
marketing approval each time a “reasonable” off-label use is 
contemplated;337 on the other hand, medical devices that are granted 
through pre-marketing approval (even on the basis of false, misleading, or 
incomplete information) for one use can do significant damage in the 
medical setting if used differently.338 With broad implied preemption, 
device manufacturers might be faced with an incentive to seek FDA 
approval for the most minimal contemplated use—and thereafter market the 
product for additional, perhaps largely untested, uses—with impunity.339 
A recent example of an alleged off-label use of a medical device that a 
state court determined might fit through the MDA “implied preemption” 
window concerned use of products that included INFUSE—a genetically 
engineered protein that has been widely used in spinal surgeries—and is 
currently the subject of a congressional investigation.340 In Cabana v. 
Stryker Biotech, LLC and Medtronic, Inc.,341 a state court action in 
California, the plaintiff, April Cabana, claimed that she initially suffered 
permanent, debilitating injuries in her spinal column as a result of two 
products (Calstrux and OP-l) manufactured by Stryker that were mixed 
together in a manner not approved by the FDA.342  Cabana alleged that 
Stryker promoted use of the products off-label, knowing that doing so could 
result in harm.343 Stryker was subsequently indicted in federal court for 
illegal marketing of the products, and two of its sales managers pled guilty 
to off-label promotion.344 In a subsequent surgery to address her poor 
result, Cabana alleged that the surgeon used a Medtronic INFUSE bone 
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graft, also off-label, which failed to correct her condition.345 It was later 
reported in The Spine Journal that Medtronic failed to accurately report the 
side effects from the clinical trials, and that many of the investigators who 
worked on the studies had significant financial ties to Medtronic.346  
Medtronic defended its action on the basis that Cabana’s claim should 
be expressly preempted by the MDA since the devices received pre-
marketing approval by the FDA.347  In refusing to dismiss the matter, the 
California trial court concluded that because it is alleged that defendants 
“promoted the use of its devices in violation of federal requirements. . . . 
Riegel is not authority that plaintiff’s claims . . . are preempted here.”348 In 
support of Cabana’s claim that the INFUSE device was used off-label and 
therefore in violation of its FDA approval, Cabana offered evidence that 
Medtronic used a paid consultant to train her own physician in use of the 
bone graft for this off-label application.349 In 2012, Medtronic settled for 
$85 million in a shareholder lawsuit, which alleged that Medtronic had 
failed to divulge that more than 85% of INFUSE sales were based upon off-
label uses.350 
 
VI.     CONCLUSION: “PARALLEL” CLAIMS AS AN INTERIM MEASURE 
TOWARD PARITY FOR DRUGS AND DEVICES 
 
In the context of medical devices, three U.S. Supreme Court cases351 
create the foundation for federal preemption under the FDCA, and 
specifically, the possibility of parallel state claims. These cases, because 
they are governed by the MDA, follow a different path from the Supreme 
Court cases that guide federal preemption in the context of FDA-approved 
drugs.352 To summarize the issue as to medical devices, Lohr determined 
that the FDCA does not preempt “a traditional damages remedy for 
violations of common-law duties when those duties parallel federal 
requirements.”353 Buckman supports the bringing of state law tort claims to 
the extent that a plaintiff “rel[ies] on traditional state tort law[,]” but rejects 
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such claims if the FDCA provides “a critical element in [the] case.”354 In 
order to determine whether a state-law claim could prevail, Riegel provides 
the guidance, albeit in the context of drugs. There, the Court established a 
test for determining whether a state-law tort claim could proceed: it would 
ask whether state law imposes a safety requirement that is “different from, 
or in addition to” the federal requirement.355 This concept of a “parallel”356  
claim now awaits more precise definition by the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Until that time, the circuit courts in Bausch,357 Hughes,358 and, most 
recently, Stengel,359 can stand for the principle that it is yet unclear whether 
the FDCA actually intended to impose different tort rules for drugs and 
devices, particularly where state and federal law duties are parallel to one 
another.  Stengel, in particular, refused to reach what would otherwise be 
the inevitable conclusion that Congress intended to “deprive the States of 
any role in protecting consumers from the dangers inherent in many 
medical devices.”360 The government argued as much in its amicus curiae 
brief in Stengel, wherein it explicitly challenged the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ interpretation of parallel claims.361  Curiously, however, at the 
same time, it also successfully took a position against certiorari in the U.S. 
Supreme Court where the issues might have been vetted and resolved. So 
while the MDA in recent years has largely shielded medical device 
manufacturers from liability pursuant to state tort law, it now appears that 
the climate is shifting, and it is only a matter of time before there is more 
activity in the circuit courts that lead to another case making its way to the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Until that time, Stengel provides compelling 
arguments, including the voice of the government, in favor of allowing 
state-law tort claims against manufacturers of medical devices. 
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